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“Hearsay is inherently unreliable.”1
“The study of the reliability of hearsay is long overdue. Indeed, the
behavioral assumptions on which the legal doctrine of the hearsay
rule and its exceptions rest have never been rigorously, scientifically
tested during the three centuries of their evolution.”2

I. INTRODUCTION
The law of evidence and the field of medicine intersect as a
product of multiple hearsay exceptions. Federal Rule of Evidence
(“FRE”) 803(6), records of a regularly conducted activity, by its
terms, applies to a record of a condition, opinion, or diagnosis.3 FRE
803(18), statements in learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets,
applies to medical expert witnesses.4 FRE 803(3) applies to a

* B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M (Health Law), Professor of Law, University of
Illinois Chicago School of Law. The author thanks his wife, Janice, for her never
ending inspiration and support, his son, Brian, a brilliant appellate lawyer, and
his grandson, Dave, for their inspiration. The author thanks Ms. Paige
Krueger, his research assistant, for her research, citation checking and
proofreading efforts. The author also thanks University of Illinois Chicago
School of Law which provided a stipend for this project.
1. Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule
803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 145, 145 (1991).
2. Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 485, 487 (1999).
3. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
4. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
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declarant’s statement of a then-existing medical condition.5 This
paper, however, focuses on FRE 803(4), a textually brief hearsay
exception, covering a statement made for medical diagnosis or
treatment,6 which provides as follows:
(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement
that:
is made for ─ and is reasonably pertinent to ─ medical diagnosis or
treatment; and
(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or
sensations; their inception; or their general cause.7

For analytical purposes, this paper assumes that the declarant
is the patient8 and the witness is the health care provider, typically
a physician, even though FRE 803(4) does not so limit the
declarant.9 This is an important assumption because this paper will
primarily address the patient-declarant as a reliable “historian” or
“reporter.” This implicates issues pertaining to the physicianpatient relationship and whether FRE 803(4) is properly a hearsay
exception.
This paper will also address whether FRE 803(4) should refer
to a declarant’s statement made for medical diagnosis and
treatment as opposed to statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment. This topic questions whether non-treating physicians
should be capable of arriving at diagnoses and whether FRE 803(4)
should apply to declarant’s statements to independent medical
examiners.

II. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS-UNDERLYING POLICY
It has been urged that “the [hearsay] exceptions in Rules 803
and 804 make admissibility dependent on only the circumstances
surrounding the hearsay statement in question.”10 These exceptions
“require a guarantee of trustworthiness.”11 “Wigmore consider[ed]
two factors to be controlling: (1) a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness (reliability), and (2) necessity.”12 One important
5. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
6. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
7. Id.
8. See Francois v. Gen. Health Sys., 459 F. Supp. 3d 710, 723 (M.D. La.
2020).
9. For example, could a declarant-physician’s statement to another
physician qualify under the terms of FRE 803(4)?
10. Victor Gold, The Three Commandments of Amending the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615 (2017).
11. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s) for Hearsay
Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2016).
12. Wilbur E. Simmons, Jr., Is Necessity Alone Sufficient Basis for Hearsay
Exception? – Moore v. Atlanta Transit System, Inc., 23 MD. L. REV. 157, 159
(1963).
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author has added the “adequate foundation,” the “substantial
foundation,” or the “sufficient foundation” rationales for hearsay
exceptions, which operate to assist the jury (or the judge in a bench
trial) in assessing reliability.13
As three examples of historically (supposedly) reliable hearsay
exceptions, one may consider records of a regularly conducted
activity,14 statements against interest,15 and statements made
under the belief of impending death.16 FRE 803(6) is based, in part,
on the reliability of contemporaneous record entries meaning record
entries made at or very near the time of the transaction or event
involved. FRE 804(b)(3) is based on the reliability of the declarant’s
statement, which is inculpatory in a criminal or civil sense. FRE
804(b)(2) is based on the reliability of the “death bed” statement,
i.e., that the victim of an event believed to be life-ending by the
victim will only speak the truth. Of course, these underlying
assumptions supporting the hearsay exceptions are subject to
challenge.17

III. FRE 803(4): RELIABILITY OF THE PATIENTDECLARANT & MEDICINE
“[R]eliability simply means the extent to which information
can be trusted.”18
The reliability of the FRE 803(4) patient-declarant’s statement
to a physician relating to “medical history; past or present
symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause”19
was described more than forty years ago. The reliability is
dependent on “[t]he patient’s desire for effective treatment, and not
the immediacy of the statement, became the guarantor of
trustworthiness.”20
The reliability of a patient’s statements to physicians has been
questioned more recently in legal scholarship.21 Without reference
to authority, “[t]he undeniable fact is that people see doctors for
many reasons and have varying motives for describing their present
13. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1488-90.
14. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
15. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
16. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
17. See Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declarations and Modern
Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1425 (2010); Michael
M. Martin, The Supreme Court Rules on Statements Against Interest, 11 TOURO
L. REV. 179, 181 (1994); Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1490.
18. Pamela A. Moss, The Meaning and Consequences of “Reliability,” 29 J.
EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 245, 246 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
19. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
20. William H. Theis, The Doctor as Witness: Statements for Purposes of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 10 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 363, 364 (1979).
21. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1489.
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and past medical symptoms. There is no way to assess which
statements are likely to be reliable.”22 The purpose of this paper is
not to dispute the possible unreliability of the patient-declarant’s
statement to a physician. Instead, the plan at this point is to
examine medical scholarship in an effort to evaluate the likely
reliability of FRE 803(4) statements.
Medical literature is replete with opinions and studies which
conclude that statements made by patients to their physicians are
unreliable due to the hesitancy to disclose accurate information or
the telling of lies.23 In either case, patients are often, intentionally,
poor historians when providing health information to their
physicians.
A publication of the American Medical Association has noted
that “there is a long-standing conventional belief in the field of
medicine that patients lie to clinicians.”24 The same publication
identified patients’ reasons for non-disclosure of information to
clinicians as:
─ not wanting to be judged or lectured;
─ not wanting to hear how harmful the behavior is;
─ embarrassment;
─ not wanting the clinician to think that they are a difficult patient;
─ not wanting to take up more of the clinician’s time.25
A Canadian medical journal has reported “seven scenarios in which
patients tend to avoid telling the truth,”26 as follows:
─ patients disagree with a doctor’s advice;
─ patients did not understand treatment instructions;
─ unhealthy diet, lack of exercise;
─ did not want the doctor to lecture the patient;
─ patient embarrassment;
─ did not want to be difficult or waste a physician’s time;
─ embarrassment regarding diet, exercise habits, sex lives or
adherence to treatments.27

The Primary Care Companion Journal of Clinical Psychiatry
has reported that “[p]atients . . . lie about symptoms to obtain
disability or access to controlled medication or to avoid
22. Id.
23. Lauren Vogel, Why do Patients Often Lie To Their Doctors?, 191 CAN.
MED. ASS’N J. E115 (2019).
24. Andrea Gurmankin Levy et al., Prevalence of and Factors Associated
with Patient Nondisclosure of Medically Relevant Information to Clinicians, 1
J. AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN 1, 2 (2018).
25. Id. at 5, 6.
26. Vogel, supra note 23.
27. Id.
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incarceration or other undesired legal consequences of their
actions.”28 Also, “[p]atients lie to avoid negative consequences, to
achieve secondary gain (e.g., to obtain medication or disability
payments), out of embarrassment or shame, or to present
themselves in a better light (e.g., as dutiful and compliant).”29
Physicians understand “that making an accurate diagnosis relies on
the provision of reliable information by patients . . . .”30
If it is well understood in medicine that patients are not
reliable reporters ─ that they refuse to disclose information and
routinely lie to their physicians – what are the consequences, if any,
for FRE 803(4)? Should there be some controversy regarding the
viability of FRE 803(4) as a hearsay exception? Should litigants and
courts have the ability to challenge FRE 803(4) reliability?

IV.

FRE 803(4): RELIABILITY OF THE PATIENTDECLARANT & LAW

I have previously written that courts do not understand
medicine.31 Courts in the United States, including the United States
Supreme Court,32 simply believe that “statements made in the
course of receiving medical care . . . are made in contexts that
provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.”33 In White
v. Illinois,34 the Supreme Court stated:
[A] statement made in the course of procuring medical services,
where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause
misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of
credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom
testimony.35

Of course, the evidence contained in medical literature,
previously referred to in this paper, contradicts this thinking, is
readily available to, and is seemingly ignored by courts. The
Supreme Court’s statement in White is wishful thinking. The
notion that courts ignore medicine was well noted by Judge Posner,
albeit in a different context, in Jackson v. Pollion.36 Judge Posner
28. John J. Palmieri & Theodore A. Stern, Lies in the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 11 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 163, 165
(2009).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 163.
31. See Marc D. Ginsberg, Non-Physician vs. Physician: Cross-Disciplinary
Expert Testimony in Medical Negligence Litigation − Who Knows the Standard
of Care?, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 725 (2019) (citing my prior law review article
which cites to Judge Posner’s opinion in Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790
(7th Cir. 2013)).
32. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992).
33. Id. at 355.
34. Id. at 346.
35. Id. at 356.
36. Jackson, 733 F.3d at 786.

684

UIC Law Review

[54:679

stated:
Like the lawyers, the two judges made no reference to any medical
literature … But if they were going to venture an opinion on the
“objective seriousness” of the plaintiff’s “medical condition,” they had
to get the condition right ─ ….
To determine the effect on the plaintiff’s health of a temporary
interruption in his medication, the lawyers in the first instance, and
if they did their job the judges in the second instance, would have had
to make some investment in learning about the condition. That could
have taken the form . . . [of] just consulting a reputable medical
treatise. The legal profession must get over its fear and loathing of
science.37

This having been said, what is a trial court to do when
considering a FRE 803(4) statement? This is no small undertaking
as the issue raised here is not simply that of a court ignoring
medical evidence relating to the plaintiff’s prima facie case or
defendant’s defense. Here, the problem concerns the application of
FRE 803(4), which is, indisputably, a revered component of the law
of evidence.
First, there is no doubt that hearsay evidence must be relevant
to be admissible,38 even if the hearsay statement fits within a
recognized hearsay exception.39 Then, the analysis becomes more
complicated. Can a trial court refuse to admit a hearsay statement
which otherwise fits within the FRE 803(4) exception if the court
were to recognize the medical literature indicating that patients
often do not provide accurate information to their physicians? It has
been held that “[u]nder the hearsay rule, the trial court retains the
power to exclude evidence that is unreliable . . . .”40
United States Courts of Appeals have developed FRE 803(4)
admissibility tests.41 In United States v. Joe,42 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained the test adopted by the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits, as follows:
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits . . . have employed the following twopart test to determine a statement’s admissibility under Rule 803(4):
“first, the declarant’s motive in making the statement must be
consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and second, the
content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a
37. Id. at 790.
38. FED. R. EVID. 402.
39. See Norman M. Garland, An Overview of Relevance and Hearsay: A Nine
Step Analytical Guide, 22 SW. U. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1993).
40. Coulter v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 198 Ariz. 384, 388 (Ct. App. 1st Div.
2000) (citing 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277, 248 (John W. Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992); 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.11(7)(a), 803-76 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 1997)).
41. See United States v. Harry, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1230, 1232 (D.N.M.
2014) (referring to tests developed by the Tenth, Fourth and Eighth Circuits).
42. 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993).
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physician in treatment or diagnosis.”43

The Tenth Circuit, in Joe,44 rejected this test as “not
contemplated by the rule and . . . not necessary to ensure that the
rule’s purpose is carried out.”45 Instead, the court simply held that
“the plain language of Rule 803(4) should guide us in determining
the admissibility of statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment.”46
The Seventh Circuit has pronounced that the FRE 803(4)
admissibility test “is whether such statements are of the type
reasonably pertinent to a physician in providing treatment.”47 In
Gong v. Hirsch,48 the Seventh Circuit also referred with approval to
the admissibility test suggested by Judge Weinstein’s evidence
treatise as “the same as under Rule 703 ─ whether an expert in the
field would be justified in relying upon this statement in rendering
his opinion.”49
These “tests” for FRE 803(4) admissibility are not necessarily
helpful. Statements fitting within hearsay exceptions are not
necessarily admissible in the absence of relevance, yet the
aforementioned “tests” suggest that the opposite is true,
particularly if there is an argument for unreliability. Therefore, is
there a vehicle by which to bring a FRE 803(4) admissibility issue
to the attention of a trial court in advance of an objection to trial
testimony? Is it possible to raise the issue of unreliability before
trial?
The motion in limine appears to be an available vehicle
through which, at least, some FRE 803(4) issues may be raised
before trial.50 The relevance51 of FRE 803(4) statements is a fair
subject of a motion in limine.52 The application of FRE 40353 as a
method to exclude otherwise relevant evidence is also a proper
subject of a motion in limine.54
Worthy of mention is that the FRE does not address motions
in limine.55 Instead, it is thought that the authority for motions in
43. Id. at 1494 n.5 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 1488.
45. Id. at 1494 n.5.
46. Id.
47. Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1986).
48. 913 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1990).
49. Id. at 1273−74 (citing 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE ¶ 803(4)[01], 803-146 to 803-147 (1988)).
50. See United States v. Woody, 336 F.R.D. 293, 301, 309-10 (D.N.M. 2020);
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 4119, 2013 WL 174416 (S.D.N.Y
Jan. 15, 2013); Samaan v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 238, 239-40 (D.
Me. 2011).
51. FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance).
52. See In re Fosamax, 2013 WL 174416.
53. FED. R. EVID. 403 (explaining the exclusion of otherwise relevant
evidence).
54. See Samaan, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40.
55. Jennifer M. Miller, To Argue Is Human, to Exclude, Divine: The Role of
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limine derives from “the trial court’s inherent powers, the court’s
power to determine threshold questions of admissibility under
[FRE] 104, and the court’s power to determine evidentiary
questions at the pretrial conference.”56 Notwithstanding the
availability of the motion in limine as a vehicle to address certain
FRE 803(4) issues, whether reliability may be addressed is another
matter. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. George57 may
be instructive.
In George,58 the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal of a
conviction for sexual abuse. Among the appellate issues was a
physician’s testimony “to a hearsay statement identifying George as
the assailant, which the victim made during the course of [the
physician’s] examination of her.”59 The defendant urged that the
admission of the physician’s testimony constituted a Confrontation
Clause violation.60
In addressing this issue, the Ninth Circuit’s comments suggest
that the declarant’s reliability for purposes of FRE 803(4) may not
be subject to a direct attack. Consider these statements of the Ninth
Circuit:
Hearsay testimony is barred by the Confrontation Clause in criminal
cases unless, inter alia, it has “adequate indicia of reliability.” The
reliability requirement is satisfied if the statement falls within a
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” or if it is supported by
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” The trial court
admitted [the physician’s] hearsay testimony pursuant to the hearsay
rule’s medical examination exception . . . [FRE] 803(4). The medical
examination exception is a firmly rooted hearsay exception. When
hearsay testimony is properly admitted pursuant to this exception,
no further guarantees of trustworthiness are required.61

These comments clearly suggest that a declarant’s statement
which satisfies the text of FRE 803(4), a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, is reliable. Unless reliability can be addressed as a legal
matter, referring to medical scholarship indicating that patients
routinely do not tell their physicians the truth (for various reasons),
arguably it can be indirectly addressed by cross-examining the
physician-witness. Pursuant to FRE 611(b),62 the physician-witness
can be cross-examined on the subject matter of direct examination,
Motions in Limine and the Importance of Preserving the Record on Appeal, 32
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 541, 543 (2009) (“No state or federal rule clearly recognizes
the motion in limine.”).
56. Christopher B. Mead, Motions in Limine: The Little Motion that Could,
24 LITIG. 52, 52 (1998). See also Edna Selan Epstein, Motions in Limine ─ a
Primer, 8 LITIG. 34, 35 (1982).
57. 960 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1992).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 98−99.
60. Id. at 99.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. FED. R. EVID. 611(b); See also Theis, supra note 20, at 365.
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which would include the physician’s FRE 803(4) testimony. Of
course, by that point at trial, the jury will have already heard the
declarant’s statement. If FRE 803(4) presumes reliability, the trial
court would need to determine if reliability was a proper subject for
cross-examination.
An examination of a few state court opinions, from Maine,
Colorado, Mississippi, and Texas, provides insight as to how some
courts evaluate declarant reliability. In Walton v. Ireland,63 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered the application of
Maine’s Rule of Evidence 803(4),64 which provides a hearsay
exception for statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”65 Interestingly, the Supreme
Judicial Court, in characterizing the reliability of a declarant’s
statement, pronounced:
The reliability of a hearsay statement . . . goes to its weight, not its
admissibility; it is a matter for the fact-finder to consider in its
evaluation of all the evidence, and not for the court to consider in
determining the admissibility of the statement.
Absent a change to the rules of evidence, we decline to require an
additional showing of reliability for hearsay statements that fall
within the Rule 803(4) exception.66

Of course, under this approach, the only available attack on
reliability is through cross-examination.
In Kelly v. Haralampopoulos,67 the Supreme Court of Colorado
considered the application of Colorado Rule of Evidence 803(4),68
which is similar to FRE 803(4). Here, the Supreme Court
emphatically stated that there is no “test of reliability that is
separate from the ‘made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment’ language of the Rule.”69
A decidedly different approach was taken by the Court of
Appeals of Mississippi in Carpenter v. State.70 The Court of Appeals
recognized that the trial court conducted “an on-the-record
reliability determination”71 “[p]rior to trial”72 and “outside the
presence of the jury.”73 The trial court’s determination, following the
63. 104 A.3d 883 (Me. 2014).
64. ME. R. EVID. 803(4).
65. Walton, 104 A.3d at 886.
66. Id. at 887−88.
67. 327 P.3d 255 (Colo. 2014).
68. COLO. R. EVID. 803(4).
69. Kelly, 327 P.3d at 265.
70. 132 So. 3d 1053 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
71. Id. at 1057.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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hearing, although lengthy, is worthy of repetition here:
Considering any apparent motive on the declarant’s part to lie, the
general character of the declarant, the number of persons that were
present and heard the statements that were made, the spontaneity of
the statements made, the timing of the declaration, the relationship
between the declarant and the witnesses, the possibility of faulty
recollection, the certainty of the statements made, the credibility of
the persons testifying about the statements, the age and maturity
level of the declarant, whether any suggestive techniques were used
in eliciting the statements, and whether the declarant’s age,
knowledge, and experience make it unlikely or rather the likeliness
of the declarant’s statement[s] being fabricated, and in . . . including
or considering the time, content, and circumstances of the statements
made, the court finds it provides a substantial indicia of reliability . .
. .74

This approach to a reliability determination is consistent with
the use of a motion in limine to obtain a pre-trial ruling. Certainly,
this extensive, detailed approach by the trial court is case specific
and perhaps not required in every case. Nevertheless, this method
provides a pre-trial opportunity to urge the lack of reliability of a
statement which appears to satisfy the hearsay exception.
A rather interesting, yet perplexing, case is Sneed v. State,75
an opinion of the Court of Appeals of Texas involving a “felony
conviction for driving while intoxicated.”76 Here, the defendant
sought admission into evidence of his medical records to establish
that “he previously suffered a head injury and was taking
medication at the time he was arrested for driving while
intoxicated.”77 These were “potentially exculpatory post-arrest
medi[c]al records.”78 The defendant urged admissibility pursuant to
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 803(4), the hearsay exception for
“statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment.”79 As with FRE 803(4), the “exception is based on the
rationale a patient will provide accurate information to a doctor in
order to receive effective treatment.”80 The trial court excluded the
evidence but “did not articulate the basis for its exclusionary ruling
. . . .”81
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the
evidence as it was self-serving, which according to the Court of
Appeals, reduced the reliability of the statements contained in the
medical records.82 Of course, the difficulty with the Court of
74. Id.
75. 955 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
76. Id. at 452.
77. Id. at 452−53.
78. Id. at 453.
79. Id. (citing TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 803(4)).
80. Sneed, 955 S.W.2d at 453 (citation omitted).
81. Id.
82. Sneed, 955 S.W.2d at 454-55.
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Appeals’ rationale for inadmissibility is that all evidence should be
self-serving. That is, for evidence to be compelling, it should be
helpful to the party seeking to introduce it. If self-serving evidence
suffers from reduced reliability, then, theoretically, all evidence
should be subject to exclusion, a result which is preposterous.

V. FRE 803(4): OTHER SIGNIFICANT PRINCIPLES
Despite the fact that the text of FRE 803(4) neither identifies
the declarant as the patient nor demands that the declarant is the
patient, it is clear that federal courts require the declarant to be the
patient, i.e., the person seeking treatment.83 Referring to the
previous discussion of patient unreliability, one might question why
FRE 803(4) would not encompass statements by a declarantphysician to a testifying witness physician. It seems reasonable that
a physician’s statement to a physician colleague pertaining to
medical diagnosis or treatment would be more reliable and
trustworthy than a statement by a patient-declarant. Nevertheless,
that position is not likely to prevail.84
FRE 803(4) statements must be made to medical professionals,
but not necessarily limited to physicians. This point was recently
made by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Earth,85 where the
Court held that FRE 803(4) applied to a declarant’s statement to an
EMT.86 Therefore, statements to non-physician health care
professionals, including nurses and allied health professionals,
should qualify as FRE 803(4) statements.87
The declarant’s FRE 803(4) statement need not be spontaneous
or volunteered. The statement may be in response to a physician’s
question. This application of FRE 803(4) was well explained by the
Sixth Circuit in Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co. v. Jones,88 a
case involving a “judgment . . . rescinding a life insurance policy . .
. because of a material misrepresentation made by [the insured]

83. See Francois v. Gen. Health Sys., 459 F. Supp. 3d 710, 723 (M.D. La.
2020); Tucker v. Nelson, 390 F. Supp. 3d 858, 862 (S.D. Ohio 2019); Bombard v.
Fort Wayne Newspapers, 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996); Bulthuis v. Rexall
Corp., 789 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1985).
84. See Tucker, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 862 (FED. R. EVID. 803(4) does not apply
to statement of declarant−physician who was consulted during the course of
treatment).
85. 984 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 2021).
86. Id. at 1294-96.
87. For example, Allied Health Professionals may include physiotherapists,
occupational therapists, speech pathologists (Robyn L. Saxon et al., Extended
Roles for Allied Health Professionals: An Updated Systematic Review of the
Evidence, 7 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY HEALTHCARE 479 (2014)) and dental
hygienists (Thomas W. Elwood, Patchwork of Scope−of−Practice Regulations
Prevent Allied Health Professionals from Fully Participating in Patient Care, 32
HEALTH AFFS. 1985 (2013)).
88. No. 92-6263, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21976, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 1993).
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concerning his history of smoking.”89 The Sixth Circuit stated:
. . . he was asked by [physicians] to relate to them his medical history
as well as any personal habits which might influence the course of
treatment. There can be little doubt that information regarding [his]
smoking history was relevant to the physicians’ efforts to alleviate his
illness. It was precisely the kind of patient-generated information
contemplated by Rule 803(4) as being reliable and credible.
Their inquiries were plainly relevant to their efforts to cure his
illness. The thought behind Rule 803(4) is that when a patient
answers questions of this type there is a high probability that the
response provided will be trustworthy because of the patient’s natural
interest in aiding his or her recovery.90

The non-spontaneous statement of the declarant is not limited
to the FRE 803(4) hearsay exception. It is also a feature of the
“dying declaration.”91 McCormick has noted that “occasionally,
dying declarations have been limited with regard to statements
elicited by leading questions. However, no blanket limitation
against statements in response to questions is generally recognized
or appropriate.”92
The Fourth Circuit, in Morgan v. Foretich,93 held that FRE
803(4) may be satisfied by a young child-declarant’s statement even
if the child is incompetent to testify at trial.94 The rationale is twofold. “First, a young child will have the same motive to make true
statements for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment as an adult.”95
Next, “statements of a child are ‘reasonably relied on by a physician
in treatment or diagnosis.’”96
Finally, insofar as basic principles are concerned, the FRE
803(4) declarant’s statement need not be made to a physician
actually involved in the declarant’s treatment. FRE 803(4)
statements may be made to health care providers consulted for the
purpose of testifying at trial.97 An example would be statements
made to a child psychologist “who had spent over one hundred hours

89. Id.
90. Id. at *11-12, 15.
91. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
92. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 705 (Robert P.
Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020).
93. 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988).
94. Id. at 949. See FED. R. EVID. 601.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citation omitted). It should be noted that this paper does not focus
on statements of child−declarants in child abuse/sexual assault litigation. The
child−declarant is well discussed in legal scholarship. Myrna S. Raeder,
Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection
of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009 (2007); Robert P.
Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989).
97. Morgan, 846 F.2d at 941.
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examining and working with [a child abuse victim].”98 The Fourth
Circuit has explained that “Rule 803(4) ‘abolished the [common law]
distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of
treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only: the
latter usually refers to a doctor who is consulted only in order to
testify as a witness.’”99
The rationale underlying the FRE 803(4) application to
statements made to physicians consulted for litigation purposes has
been soundly criticized many years ago in a law review article
primarily focused on Illinois law.100 Here, it is explained that:

If the patient is presumed to tell the truth when he wants effective
treatment, the law should assume no similar reliability when the
patient is describing his illness to a doctor from whom he does not
seek treatment. When the patient seeks an expert for purposes of
testifying, he seeks only to better his legal position; he not only lacks
the motivation to be truthful, but he actually has a motivation to be
untruthful.101

The Illinois Rules of Evidence (“IRE”) have specifically
addressed this issue. IRE 803(4)(A) provides:
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.
(A) Statements made for purposes of medical treatment, or medical
diagnosis in contemplation of treatment, and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment but, subject
to [IRE] 703, not including statements made to a health care provider
consulted solely for the purpose of preparing for litigation or
obtaining testimony for trial . . . . 102

Statements to health care providers for litigation purposes are
not encompassed by the hearsay exception contained in the IRE.
Pennsylvania’s Rule of Evidence 803(4) is not identical to the
Illinois rule. Pennsylvania’s rule provides as follows:
(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement
that:
is made for--and is reasonably pertinent to--medical treatment or
diagnosis in contemplation of treatment; and
describes medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment,

98. Id. at 948.
99. Id. at 950 (citation omitted).
100. Theis, supra note 20, at 371.
101. Id.
102. ILL. R. EVID. 803(4)(A).
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or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.103

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has similarly held that the
medical treatment hearsay exception applies to “statements which
were made for the purposes of receiving medical treatment . . . .”104
The application of FRE 803(4) to statements to health care
providers solely for litigation purposes deserves some attention in
the context of the independent medical examination. The next
section of this paper addresses this topic.

VI. THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION
The independent medical examination has been well
described in medical literature, as follows:
An independent medical evaluation (IME) is an assessment
performed by a physician who does not treat the patient. Disability
insurers, employers or lawyers often request an IME when faced with
uncertainty about the cause or nature of a claimed disability, or the
functional status and/or rehabilitation potential of the claimant.105

Independent medical examinations are provided for by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 35. Physical and Mental Examinations
(a) Order for an Examination.
(1) In General. The court where the action is pending may order a
party whose mental or physical condition ─ including blood group ─
is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
suitably licensed or certified examiner. The court has the same
authority to order a party to produce for examination a person who is
in its custody or under its legal control.106

Insofar as FRE 803(4) is concerned, this paper has previously
referred to the unreliability of patients’ statements to physicians.
This point merits repeating with respect to the independent medical
examination.107
Medical literature has warned of the inherent problems with

103. PA. R. EVID. 803(4)(A)-(B).
104. Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Pa. 1996).
105. Shanil Ebrahim et al., Ethics and Legalities Associated with
Independent Medical Evaluations, 186 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 248, 248 (2014).
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1).
107. Not addressed in this paper is the fascinating issue of whether an
independent medical examiner owes a duty of care to the examinee. The reader
is encouraged to refer to the following: Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111 (Alaska
2010); Ritchie v. Krasner, 211 P.3d 1272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Hafner v. Beck,
916 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Liza H. Gold & John E. Davidson, Do You
Understand Your Risk? Liability and Third-Party Evaluations in Civil
Litigation, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 200 (2007); Donna Vanderpool,
Professional Liability for Forensic Activities: Liability Without a Treatment
Relationship, 13 INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 41 (2016).
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independent medical examinations.108 Consider the following:
“Examiners must also carefully consider patient motivations and
perceived gains associated with IMEs. For example, poor job
satisfaction may lead some patients to view the IME as a means of
securing financial stability without returning to work.”109
“Some patients may feign their own illness in order to gain worker’s
compensation benefits for the purpose of caring for a loved one.
Furthermore, because of serious illness in close family members,
other patients may create or exaggerate their own illness so they can
care for someone close to them.”110
“There are currently a number of organizations and websites that
provide information to patients on methods of maximizing the
appearance of injury and even feigning a workplace injury. . . .
Unfortunately, these resources may invite claimants to exaggerate or
fake injuries in a manner that is difficult for the physician to
detect.”111

These comments reinforce the notion that statements by
patient-declarants to health care providers tend to be unreliable.
This problem is exacerbated in the context of the independent
medical examination, in which the role of the examining physician
is not treatment related.

VII. CONCLUSION-A MODEST PROPOSAL
This paper has demonstrated the tension between law and
medicine in the context of FRE 803(4). Courts have routinely taken
the position that statements appearing to satisfy the FRE 803(4)
requirements are reliable. Arguably, courts find these statements
reliable based on the notion that patients understand that effective
medical treatment is predicated, in part, on the health care
provider’s receipt of accurate, truthful information from patients
and that patients, therefore, will provide this information.
Unfortunately, medical literature suggests that this is not true, and
that patients are not necessarily inclined to provide health care
providers with accurate information.
Even if the argument for FRE 803(4) applies to statements
made to health care providers who are involved in the treatment
process, the argument is decidedly weaker when considering health
care providers not involved in the treatment process − those
consulted for litigation purposes. A “clinician . . . makes diagnoses
on the basis of history, physical examination, accumulated
laboratory data and X-ray findings, and is fundamentally concerned
108. See Paul Ky et al., Independent Medical Examinations: Facts and
Fallacies, 12 PAIN PHYSICIAN 811, 812-14 (2009).
109. Id. at 813.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 815.
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with treatment.”112 Furthermore, “before [the physician] can fit the
disease into a known category, [the physician] must similarly have
a period of observation, fortified by special tests and diagnostic
procedures.”113 In fact, in 1917, the term diagnosis was defined as
follows:
Diagnosis means more than merely naming a disease. It demands
such accurate sub-classification and intelligent, painstaking
individualization, as necessitates a knowledge of etiologic factors, the
nature and sequence of pathologic changes, the effect of age,
occupation, residence, habits, heredity, past ailments, and even of the
constitutional peculiarities and personal characteristics of the
individual.114

A physician not involved in the treatment process is unlikely
to have all of the aforementioned information available to a clinician
and therefore is less likely to know if the patient-declarant has
provided reliable information.
Therefore, my recommendation is quite simple. The FRE
803(4) hearsay exception should not be eliminated. Certainly, there
are patient-declarants who are excellent historians and reporters of
their health conditions and provide reliable information to their
health care providers in the quest for effective medical treatment.
Regrettably, other patient-declarants do not reliably communicate
with their health care providers. Courts should be able to address
declarant reliability on a pre-trial basis through the motion in
limine. Otherwise, cross-examination provides the only check on
reliability, elevating credibility over admissibility.
An amendment to FRE 803(4) would be helpful, yielding a rule
similar to those adopted in Illinois or Pennsylvania. Eliminating the
application of FRE 803(4) to statements made to expert witnesses
and independent medical examiners would produce a rule focusing
on diagnosis essential to the treatment process.

112. Lester S. King, The Meaning of Medical Diagnosis, 8 ETC: REV. GEN.
SEMANTICS 202, 202 (1951).
113. Id. at 203.
114. CHARLES LYMAN GREENE, MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS FOR THE STUDENT AND
PRACTITIONER 1, 1 (1917).

